Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Economics Faculty Research and Publications

Economics, Department of

5-1-2017

“No Shut-off ” Policies and Natural Gas
Consumption
David E. Clark
Marquette University, david.clark@marquette.edu

Catherine Dybicz
Andrew Hanson
Marquette University, andrew.r.hanson@marquette.edu

Farrokh Nourzad
Marquette University, farrokh.nourzad@marquette.edu

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Resource and
Energy Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing,
corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this
document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A
definitive version was subsequently published in Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 48 (May 2017):
19-29. DOI. © 2017 Elsevier. Used with permission.

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

“No shut-off” policies and
natural gas consumption
David E. Clark
Department of Economics, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Catherine Dybicz
Department of Economics, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Andrew Hanson
Department of Economics, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Farrokh Nourzad
Department of Economics, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Abstract: Many U.S. states have regulations that prevent natural gas utility
companies from turning off service to non-paying consumers. The goal of
these policies, termed “no shut-off” (NSO) regulations, is to provide a
guaranteed minimum level of residential comfort by reducing the marginal
cost of consumption to zero for a period of time. This paper employs a
difference-in-difference approach applied to residential U.S. Energy
Information Administration data to evaluate whether NSO policies generate
higher levels of gas usage. Our preferred specifications suggest that
activation of a NSO policy increases natural gas consumption by between 4.7–
4.8%, resulting in a total increase of between 66 and 67 billion cubic feet of
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natural gas consumed per winter season in covered states, at a value of as
much as $950–970 million annually.
Keywords: Natural gas usage, Utility regulation

1. Introduction
Nearly all U.S. states have regulations preventing utility
companies from disconnecting customers’ natural gas (used for home
heating). While the specifics of these regulations differ, they are
primarily designed to prevent gas providers from ceasing service to
non-paying customers. The goal of these policies, termed “no shut-off”
(NSO) regulations, is to provide the less fortunate with habitable
housing when circumstances may otherwise prevent such a
transaction; however; NSO policies achieve this goal by artificially
reducing the marginal cost of consuming natural gas, which may result
in inefficient levels of consumption relative to facing full market
prices.1 Despite nearly every state in the U.S employing some type of
NSO regulation, there has been no previous evaluation of their effect
on natural gas markets. This paper is the first to combine
documentation of these policies with consumption data and examine
the extent that residential natural gas consumption changes in the
presence of NSO policies.
Our estimation strategy is to use policies that are enforced
under a date-based mandate, or that become active in a given state
between set calendar dates, regardless of local weather conditions. We
highlight date-based policies as a way to avoid endogeneity in
estimation. We use two difference-in-difference type estimation
strategies to test whether average consumption increases when a NSO
policy is active. The first identification strategy uses two-way fixed
effects (state and month/year) and the timing of NSO policy activation
to measure the effects on consumption. The second uses a standard
difference-in-difference model, estimating the effect of turning the
policy on for the treated group during the treated time period relative
to the baseline difference between the group of NSO states and other
states during non-treated times. We implement both strategies
controlling for a set of covariates (weather, prices, local median
income, and year effects). In addition to our general model, we
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explore parallel models for variants of NSO policies, and an alternative
model based on a trimmed sample using a propensity score.
Our results strongly support the idea that NSO policies lead to
higher levels of natural gas consumption. Our preferred specifications
suggest that activation of a NSO policy increases natural gas
consumption by between 4.7–4.8%, resulting in a total increase of
between 66 and 67 billion cubic feet of natural gas consumed per
winter season in covered states, at a value of as much as $950–970
million annually. We also find different effects across the
heterogeneous NSO policy types that have different coverage
requirements. In specifications that expand the set of controls to
include region-month-year effects, we estimate NSO polices increase
consumption by between 2.6–3.2%, for an annual increased expense
of between $530–$650 million dollars. Surveys of natural gas
customer accounts show that approximately 24% of customers have
account balances that are past due, implying an increase in
consumption among this group of as much as 24.6%.
Our results complement estimates from Levinson and Niemann
(2004) that demonstrate tenants living in utility-included rental
housing (where the marginal cost of energy use is essentially zero) set
their thermostats between 1 °F and 3 °F warmer in winter months.
Levinson and Niemann generally find smaller magnitude increases in
energy use than we do here, but they also point out that their work
may provide an underestimate. Our work also represents a new
contribution to explaining the “energy paradox”, where consumers are
seemingly too slow to adopt conservation technology.2 If NSO policies
are excusing customers from paying the full cost of natural gas usage,
they have less incentive to adopt conservation technologies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes
NSO policies and outlines our identification strategy. Section 3
describes our data and offers summary statistics. Section 4 presents
results, and the final section concludes with policy discussion and
directions for future research.

2. NSO policies and empirical methodology
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Regulations that govern and restrict utility companies’ ability to
disconnect service to non-paying customers are generated at the state
level. Specific details of NSO policies vary from state to state in both
existence and terms, but the main components of the policies are
consistent. Most states with such polices prevent or delay gas
disconnection for medically-vulnerable customers year-round. In
addition, many states have some type of seasonal or weather-based
policy that protects customers during certain times of year or during
extreme cold or heat. This paper focuses on protections that affect
natural gas utilities.3 We use the term “no-shut-off policy” to refer
specifically to seasonally implemented policies throughout the paper.4
This paper focuses specifically on policies that are activated by
dates, not weather events, and are in effect for certain months during
the year, regardless of actual weather patterns. Some state NSO
policies are triggered only by temperature; for example, in Oklahoma
gas cannot be turned off when the actual or predicted temperature is
below 32 °F during the day or 20 °F at night. Since temperature-based
policies are endogenous to consumption, because consumption
increases when temperature decreases, they do not make a good
natural experiment to examine how customers react to these laws.
Date-based policies, on the other hand, go into effect regardless of
weather patterns, and promise the same protections for non-paying
customers.
Summary statistics from the Natural Regulatory Research
Institute (NRRI) reveal that NSO policies potentially cover a substantial
segment of natural gas consumers. A NRRI report from 2005 surveyed
utility providers to determine the state of consumer accounts. The
findings in the report show that the percentage of customers with a
balance due 30 days or older ranged from 34.3% in California to
9.84% in Colorado, with an average of 24% across the sample.
Furthermore, the NRRI report finds that on average only 4.5% of
customers have service disconnected, leaving a substantial share of
customers that are not paying natural gas bills and still receiving
service, and would thus be covered by the date-based NSO policies we
examine.5
Table 1 shows a summary of date-based state NSO Policies.
Besides the timeframe in which the policies are effective, policies also
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differ by state according to which group or groups of customers are
covered by the policy. Some policies apply to all natural gas customers
while others only protect certain subsets of customers, such as the
elderly, the disabled, unemployed customers, those whose income is
below a given threshold, or households qualifying for welfare
programs. We include a sub-group analysis that examines policies with
varying degrees of generosity.
Table 1. No shut off policy summary.
State

Date
Based

Other Plan

Active
Months

Type of Date Based

AL

No

Temperature –

–

AR

Yes

Temperature Need Based

Nov–March

AZ

No

Temperature –

–

CA

No

Physician
Rec

–

–

CO

No

Physician
Rec

–

–

CT

Yes

–

Need Based

Nov–April

DE

Yes

Temperature Covers All

Nov–March

FL

No

–

–

GA

Yes

Temperature Payment Plan

Nov–March

IA

Yes

Temperature Need Based

Nov–March

ID

Yes

–

Nov–March

IL

Yes

Temperature Need Based

Dec–March

IN

Yes

–

Need Based

Dec–March

KS

Yes

Temperature Need Based

Nov–March

KY

No

–

–

–

LA

No

–

–

–

MA

Yes

–

Need Based

Nov–March

MD

Yes

Temperature Vulnerable, Max Due

Nov–March

ME

Yes

–

Need Based

Nov–April

MI

Yes

–

Vulnerable, Need Based

Nov–March

–

Vulnerable, Need Based
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State

Date
Based

Other Plan

Active
Months

Type of Date Based
Need Based, Payment
Plan

MN

Yes

–

MO

Yes

Temperature Need Based

Nov–March

MS

Yes

–

Dec–March

MT

Yes

Temperature Vulnerable, Need Based

Nov–March

NC

Yes

–

Vulnerable, Need Based

Nov–March

ND

No

Payment
Plan

–

–

NE

Yes

–

Need Based, Payment
Plan

Nov–March

NH

Yes

–

Vulnerable, Need Based,
Nov–March
Max Due

NJ

Yes

–

Vulnerable, Need Based

Nov–March

NM

Yes

–

Need Based

Nov–March

NV

No

Temperature –

–

NY

Yes

–

Vulnerable

Nov–April

OH

Yes

–

Payment Plan

Nov–April

OK

No

Temperature –

–

OR

No

Physician
Rec

–

–

PA

Yes

–

Need Based

Dec–March

RI

Yes

–

Vulnerable, Max Due

Nov–April

SC

No

Temperature –

–

SD

Yes

Physician
Rec

Covers All

Nov–March

TN

No

Physician
Rec

–

–

TX

No

Temperature –

–

UT

Yes

–

Vulnerable, Need Based

Nov–March

VA

No

Physician
Rec

–

–

Need Based

Oct–April
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State

Date
Based

Other Plan

Type of Date Based

Active
Months

VT

Yes

Temperature Vulnerable

Nov–March

WA

Yes

–

Nov–March

WI

Yes

Temperature Vulnerable, Need Based

Nov–April

WV

Yes

–

Dec–Feb

WY

Yes

Temperature Vulnerable, Need Based

Need Based
Need Based

Nov–April

Notes: The “other plan” column details what other types of NSO
policies exist in a state (if any). Temperature indicates that the state
has a temperature based no shut off policy, Physician Recommend
indicates that it has a no shut off policy based on the medical
recommendation of a physician, Payment Plan indicates the state has a
no shut off policy that allows customer to be placed on a payment
plan.
Need Based indicates a date based policy that is active for customers
with demonstrated financial hardship, unemployment, recipients of
government welfare, etc.
Vulnerable indicates a date based policy that is active for customers
with illness, disability, and/or elderly or very young customers.
Max Due indicates a date based policy that is active for customers
whose outstanding bill is under a certain dollar amount.
Payment Plan indicates a date based policy that is active for customers
who commit to a payment plan to pay their outstanding bill.
Covers All indicates a date based policy that covers all customers,
regardless of characteristics.
We do not have data on policies for Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington,
D.C., these areas are excluded from the analysis. NSO policy data are
summarized from the following sources: Howat and Devanthary
(2006); Harak and Wein (2008); Harak et al. (2011); LIHEAP
Clearinghouse (2013).
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In all, 33 states have some type of date-based NSO policy.
Many of these states are Midwest and Northeastern states, but there
are also several Western and Southern States that have policies. Of
the states that have a date-based policy, the most common is a “Need
Based” policy, or one that covers only a population that has some
demonstrated financial hardship. Some states combine a need-based
criterion with a “Vulnerable” criteria, which makes the NSO policy
conditional on customer personal characteristics such as being
disabled, ill, or elderly. Other variants of date-based policies are those
that only cover customers who have an outstanding balance under a
certain dollar amount (“Max Due”), or those that agree to be put on a
payment plan (“Payment Plan”). There is also a set of states (DE and
SD) that enforce a date-based NSO policy for all natural gas customers
(“Covers All”). The second column also shows information on states
that have a separate policy covering customers based on temperature
or on the advice of a physician.
To isolate the effect of NSO policies on natural gas consumption,
it is necessary to separate the policy’s effect from all other factors that
influence consumption. Any characteristics common to those states
that have NSO policies, as well as factors common to the months in
which the policies are active must be accounted for. There could be an
unknown or unquantifiable factor or factors influencing consumption of
natural gas in the states that have NSO policies. Similarly, the months
during which policies are typically active could have more in common
with each other than what is captured by weather variables. It is
impossible to identify and measure all the characteristics common to
each group of states or months, but to ignore their influence would
certainly result in omitted-variable bias.
We offer two estimation strategies to deal with omitted
variables, both use the timing of NSO policies becoming active for
certain months to identify the effect of the policy. The two strategies
we implement are a two-way fixed effects model and a standard
difference-in-difference model. The difference between the models is
how they control for cross section variation and seasonal/time
variation. The two-way fixed effects model accounts for any timeinvariant characteristics at the individual state level, while the
standard difference-in-difference approach accounts for any timeinvariant characteristics among the group of states that choose to
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have NSO policies. The two-way fixed effects model accounts for any
time-varying or seasonal characteristics at the month-year level, while
the standard difference-in-difference approach accounts for any time
varying characteristics among the group of covered months only.
The two-way fixed effects model is:
(1)
Where the dependent variable F is the statewide monthly flow of
natural gas consumption per resident. The subscripts i, t, and m refer
to the state, year, and month, respectively. The variable NSOActive is
equal to one for the NSO states in the months when a policy is active,
and zero otherwise.6
The inclusion of state and month-year fixed effects will control
for any permanent differences between states, and for any differences
that are common to all states, but change with time or seasonality.
State fixed effects, δi, are important if there are constant factors
within each state that drive gas usage and are correlated with when
policies become active (for example a state being situated in a
particular part of the country). Month-year effects, γm,t, are important
if there are constant factors across months of the season and or years
of the data that are correlated with natural gas consumption and when
policies become active (for example, policies generally being active
during peak heating seasons). The coefficient of interest in Eq. (1) is
β1, which identifies the effect of an active NSO policy on residential
consumption of natural gas.
To account for other factors that affect gas consumption per
person that may vary by state and month/year, we add various control
variables to the base model in X. Importantly, we condition our
estimates on differences in temperature changes through the variable
Heating Degree Days. We also condition on the residential price of
natural gas, and the local median income of residents (in thousands).
The Heating Degree Days variable is expected to have a positive effect
on gas consumption, since the lower the temperature, the greater
number of heating degree days there are, and the more gas is needed
to heat homes.
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As an additional guard against unobserved heterogeneity that
may vary by time/season but be specific to particular regions, we
estimate (1) replacing γm,t with a set of region-specific month-year
effects, σr * γm,t. We present results with the region specific monthyear effects alongside of the standard two-way fixed effects results for
comparison purposes.
We also estimate a standard difference-in-difference model,
which allows us to estimate whether average consumption of natural
gas increases with an active NSO policy, relative to states without an
active policy for months the policies are typically active. This model is
a more basic version of (1), with less stringent controls for timeinvariant and time-variant effects that may be correlated with when
NSO policies become active. The difference-in-difference model tests
whether the difference between average consumption in states with a
NSO policy, and average consumption in states without a policy, shifts
when a policy becomes active. It answers the question of whether
states with an active policy consume more gas than they would have
without an active policy, by looking for a change in the difference in
consumption between states with and without a policy as a group.
The difference-in-difference specification is:
(2)
Where NSO State is a dummy variable equal to one if a state has an
NSO policy and zero if it does not. Month Covered is a dummy variable
equal to one if the calendar month is between October and April,
inclusive, and zero otherwise.7 The model identifies all states with NSO
policies and all months covered by NSO policies, and the interaction of
being a NSO state during a month that is covered. NSO Active is
similar, but not equal to, the interaction between NSO State and
Month Covered because the months in which a policy is active differ by
state, and Month Covered includes all months in which any state has
an active policy. Month Covered controls for characteristics common to
the months in which no-shut-off policies are active, but is only a
coarse replacement for the month-year effects in (1). The coefficient
of interest is β3, which tells us the marginal effect of activating an NSO
policy on monthly gas usage. All control variables in this model are the
same as the state fixed-effects model, and the model identifies the
effect of the NSO policies when they become active within a given
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state during the month specified by law. We also estimate a version of
(2) that replaces Month Covered with a month-year fixed effect. We
cluster all standard errors in both specifications at the state level.

2.1. Policy heterogeneity
In addition to estimating (1) and (2) to determine the general
effects of NSO policies, examining variations in the specific rules of the
policies may show what aspects of the policies matter most for moral
hazard. Most NSO policies only apply to certain subsets of customers,
such as the medically vulnerable or those with financial hardship. To
determine the different impact of the various policy types, k, we
estimate the following two-way fixed effect and difference-indifference specifications:
(3)
and
(4)
Where the k different policy types are described in Table 1. We
separately estimate the effect of Need Based, Vulnerable, Payment
Plan, and Covers All policies. We do not separately estimate for the
Max Due category, as it is never mutually exclusive for a state, but
note that it is tied to other policies in some states, and we cannot rule
out the effect of Max Due policies from other categories. These
regressions use states with other NSO policies as the reference group,
so the interpretation is the marginal effect of altering the NSO policy
relative to the average of all other NSO policies.

3. Data
The data on no shut-off policies come from the National
Consumer Law Center (NCLC) and the Low Income Home Energy
Assistance Program (LIHEAP). The NCLC published summary tables of
extreme weather protection rules in 2008 and 2011, while LIHEAP
maintains a current list of no-shut-off policies and provided such a
table for a study published in 2006.8 Together, these tables provide
policy data for the 48 contiguous United States from the beginning of
2006 through February of 2013. To fill in the missing years for which
there are no summary tables, we make the following assumptions. If a
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policy does not change in two subsequent tables, it is assumed that
the policy does not change over that period. For example, if a state
has the same policy in 2011 as it did in 2008, we assume that the
same policy was also in place in 2009 and 2010. Since there are very
few differences among the summary tables, this assumption seems
reasonable. Where differences do occur among the tables, state
regulations and utility company documents are assembled to pinpoint
the nature and effective date of the policy change. Although there are
several differences between the tables, most of these are due to
different methods of recording the policies rather than actual
substantive changes to the policies. There are no substantial changes
in the date-based cold weather protections between 2006 and 2013.
The dependent variable, natural gas flow per resident, is the
total statewide monthly gas consumption by residential consumers
divided by the state population. Natural gas flow data are obtained
from the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) and
are measured in millions of cubic feet. The American Gas Association
estimates that an average American house consumes 250 cubic feet of
gas per winter day. State level population data is gathered from the
census, and linearly interpolated between annual estimates to apply
monthly.
Weather is the single most important driver of natural gas
consumption, and it is also the most important factor determining
when non-date-based NSO policies are active. Heating degree days
measures the monthly sum of how many degrees the average daily
temperature is below 65°. For example, if the average temperature is
35 °F one day (30° below 65°), and 60 °F the next day (5° below
65°), the total heating degree days for these two days is 35. Heating
degree days are preferable to average monthly temperature because
they capture the variance of temperatures within each state-month,
rather than just the mean temperature. All heating degree day data
(measured in degrees Fahrenheit) are obtained from the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which is part of the United
States Department of Commerce.
Natural gas prices vary by state and time of year and affect
consumption, so we include them as a control variable. The price data
are obtained from the EIA, the same source as the natural gas flow
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data. The EIA data are given in nominal dollars per thousand cubic feet
of gas.9 We also use median income as a control variable to account
for time trends and potential seasonal adjustment to consumer
incomes that may coincide with policy activation.10

4. Results
Our primary results, shown in Tables 2 and 3 reveal that
activating an NSO policy has a large, positive, and statistically
significant effect on natural gas consumption across both state fixed
effects and difference-in-difference models. These effects remain
strong in the presence of estimating with control variables and adding
year effects to the model. The magnitude of the NSO policy effect
depends on the method and specification employed, with extremely
large estimates in specifications that do not control for local weather
conditions, and more modest estimates in specifications that control
for weather.

4.1. State fixed-effects results
Table 2 shows the results for estimating Eq. (1), using a variety
of control variables. These results show that an active NSO policy has
a large, positive, and statistically significant effect on natural gas
consumption. The largest estimates, those without controls for Heating
Degree Days, show that activation of an NSO policy causes a 10.9–
19% increase in natural gas use. The magnitude of results that do not
control for weather demonstrate omitted variable bias, as Heating
Degree Days certainly contribute to natural gas usage, and is also
likely correlated with when NSO policies become active. We take these
results as a caution on the importance of controlling for weather, even
when using date-based policy implementation to identify the effects of
NSO policies on consumption.
Table 2. Natural gas consumption and NSO Policies: two-way FE
estimates.
(1)
NSO Active

(2)

(3)

(4)
*

(5)
*

(6)

(7)

(8)
*

0.19 0.04 0.047 0.047 0.10 0.03 0.026 0.026*
**
**
0*** 8*** **
9*** 2*** **
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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(0.01 (0.01 (0.01 (0.01 (0.01 (0.01 (0.01 (0.01
3)
3)
1)
1)
2)
1)
0)
0)

Heating Degree
Days

0.00 0.001* 0.001*
**
1*** **

0.00 0.001* 0.001*
**
1*** **

(0.00 (0.00 (0.00
0)
0)
0)

(0.00 (0.00 (0.00
0)
0)
0)

Retail Price

−0.05 −0.05
3***
3***

−0.04 −0.04
1***
1***

(0.00 (0.00
1)
1)

(0.00 (0.00
1)
1)

Median Income
(thousands)

−0.00
1

0.002

(0.00
2)

(0.00
1)

State Fixed
Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month-Year
Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

4128

4128 4128 4128

Region × Mont
h × Year
No
Effects
N

4128 4128 4128

4128

R-Squared

0.96 0.96
0.97 0.98
0.976 0.976
0.985 0.985
2
8
7
2

The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural log of
monthly natural gas consumption (millions of cubic feet) per capita.
NSO Active represents the interaction between a state with an NSO
policy and a month when the policy is active for date-based NSO
policies only. Months that are partially covered by NSO policies are
considered fully covered in the data. The unit of observation is a statemonth. Standard errors clustered at State level are shown in
parentheses.
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***
p < 0.01.
Controlling for Heating Degree Days reduces the magnitude of
the results considerably. In the base two-way fixed effects
specifications that control for Heating Degree Days, our estimates
suggest that activation of an NSO policy increases natural gas
consumption by between 4.7–4.8%. These results are statistically
significant at the 1% level regardless of the set of control variables we
use. At a state-month average level of consumption of 8193 millions of
cubic feet, these results suggest NSO policies cause an increase of
385–393 million cubic feet per state, per month. With 33 state policies
in place, at an average coverage length of 5.2 months, NSO policies
cause a total increase in natural gas consumption of 66–67 billion
cubic feet per winter season. Given the average retail price of $14.40
per thousand cubic feet, active NSO policies cause between $950–970
million dollars annually in increased expense.11
In specifications with Region * Month/Year effects, shown in
columns 5–8 of Table 2, the magnitude of our estimates is smaller
than the two-way fixed effects estimates, but still positive and
statistically meaningful. These estimates, when controlling for Heating
Degree Days and a variety of other time-variant factors show that NSO
policies increase natural gas consumption by between 2.6–3.2%. At a
state-month average level of consumption of 8193 millions of cubic
feet, our most conservative results represent an increase of 213–262
million cubic feet per state, per month for a total increase in natural
gas consumption of 36–44 billion cubic feet per winter season. The
smaller magnitude estimates imply an annual increased expense of
between $530–$650 million dollars.
To put the magnitude of these estimates in further context,
consider that the most recent provider survey of natural gas customer
accounts shows 24% of customers have account balances that are
past due, but only 4.5% have service disconnected (National
Regulatory Research Institute, 2005). If average consumption is
constant across customer account types and there is no behavioral
response from customers who are not past due or already
disconnected, our estimates imply that to get to a total increase of
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between 2.6 and 4.8% (the range of estimates from our results that
control for Heating Degree Days in Table 2), customers actually
covered by NSO increase consumption by between 13 and 24.6%. If
we count current disconnected customers as being affected by the
policy, our estimates imply that covered customers increase
consumption by between 10.8 and 20%.

4.2. Difference-in-difference results
Table 3 shows the results of estimating Eq. (2), or our standard
difference-in-difference specification. As with the two-way fixed effects
model, these results rely on the date an NSO policy becomes active
being exogenous, and uncorrelated with omitted factors that drive
natural gas usage. The difference between this model and the two-way
fixed effects models, is that this specification only controls for common
cross-section characteristics for the grouping of states that have a
date-based NSO policy rather than for characteristics of individual
states and only controls for time-variant factors that are common
among months when policies are active (with the exception of
estimates that use month-year effects in columns (5) and (10)).
Table 3. Natural gas consumption and NSO policies: difference-indifference estimates.
(1)
NSO
State

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

0.04 0.09
0.04 0.09
0.100 0.091 0.206
0.101 0.090 0.178
0
0
6
2
(0.2 (0.2 (0.16 (0.15 (0.13 (0.2 (0.2 (0.15 (0.15 (0.14
31) 06) 2)
9)
7)
31) 06) 8)
6)
1)

1.01
Month
6***
Covere
(0.0
d
66)
NSO
Active

(2)

0.44 0.290 0.311
–
***
8*** ***

1.01 0.44 0.277 0.304
–
***
1*** 8*** ***

(0.1 (0.09 (0.09
10) 9)
9)

(0.0 (0.1 (0.09 (0.09
65) 11) 9)
9)

0.75 0.07 0.193 0.207
0.74 0.07 0.219 0.237 0.129
0.092 ***
**
**
**
***
*
9*** 9
7
7
(0.0 (0.1 (0.08 (0.08 (0.06 (0.0 (0.1 (0.08 (0.08 (0.07
73) 21) 7)
6)
4)
74) 22) 4)
4)
2)
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(1)
Heatin
g
Degree
Days

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

0.00 0.001 0.001 0.001
***
***
1*** ***

0.00 0.001 0.001 0.001
***
***
1*** ***

(0.0 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00
00) 0)
0)
0)

(0.0 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00
00) 0)
0)
0)

−0.0 −0.0 −0.1
96*** 97*** 11***

−0.1 −0.1 −0.1
09*** 10*** 11***

(0.02 (0.02 (0.02
0)
0)
4)

(0.02 (0.02 (0.02
2)
2)
4)

0.007 0.012

0.009 0.012

(0.00 (0.00
8)
9)

(0.00 (0.00
8)
9)

Retail
Price
Median
Incom
e
(thous
ands)
Year
Dummi No
es

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

MonthYear
No
Effects

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

N

412 412
412 412
4128 4128 4128
4128 4128 4128
8
8
8
8

R0.47 0.58
0.48 0.58
Square
0.681 0.684 0.684
0.697 0.701 0.720
6
5
0
6
d
The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural log of
monthly natural gas consumption (millions of cubic feet) per capita.
NSO State represents a dummy variable indicating a state that has a
date-based NSO policy. Month covered represents a dummy variable
for months when NSO policies are active. NSO Active represents the
interaction between a state with an NSO policy and a month when the
policy is active for date-based NSO policies only. Months that are
partially covered by NSO policies are considered fully covered in the
data. The unit of observation is a state-month. For results in column
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(10) a month for each year is omitted from the specificaion due to
colinearity. Standard errors clustered at State level are shown in
parentheses.
**
p < 0.05.
*
p < 0.1.
The results in Table 3 generally show substantially larger effects
of NSO policies on natural gas usage than the state fixed-effects
model. The most conservative estimates, which control for heating
degree days, but not prices or income, suggest a 7.7–7.9% increase in
natural gas usage, although these specifications do not produce a
statistically meaningful result. Across specifications that implement
control variables, we find the effect of an active NSO policy causes
between a 19.3 and 23.7% increase in natural gas usage, statistically
precise at either the five or one-percent level in all specifications,
except when estimating with month-year effects.
One explanation for why the difference-in-difference results are
larger than the state fixed effects results is that there is unobserved
heterogeneity within the group of states that have NSO policies. This is
picked up by the state fixed-effects models, but not the difference-indifference models because those states are treated as a group. Part of
this heterogeneity is the difference in NSO policies themselves, as we
show in Table 1. For this reason, we believe that the state fixed-effects
models are a more accurate representation of the effect of NSO
policies on natural gas consumption. Another explanation is that the
control for only months covered by NSO policies (along with the
Heating Degree Days variable) are not picking up enough of the
seasonal variation in natural gas usage that is correlated with when
policies begin and end in the calendar year.

4.3. Heterogeneous policy results
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Tables 4 (two-way fixed effects) and 5 (difference-in-difference)
show results for estimating Eqs. (3) and (4), which explore how policy
heterogeneity impacts our results. Exploring how variation in NSO
policies affects natural gas usage is also of interest because it may
shed light on how to reduce inefficient consumption, but still offer
some redistribution to the neediest consumers. One potential method
for targeting the neediest consumers is to limit the customer group(s)
they protect. For example, a policy that only covers customers who
must demonstrate medical or financial need may lead to less
inefficiency than a policy that prevents shut-offs for all customers.
Table 4. Natural gas consumption and NSO policy
heterogeneity: two-way FE estimates.

Policy
Type*NSO
Active

Covers All Need Based Vulnerable

Payment
Plan

(1)

(7)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(8)

0.070 0.041 0.092 0.057 −0.00 −0.00 −0.06 −0.10
***
**
***
***
4
4
2***
8***
(0.02 (0.02 (0.01 (0.00 (0.01 (0.01 (0.01 (0.01
3)
0)
1)
9)
2)
0)
6)
3)
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001

Heating
Degree Days

Retail Price

Median
Income
(thousands)
State Fixed
Effects

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

(0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00
0)
0)
0)
0)
0)
0)
0)
0)
−0.05 −0.03 −0.05 −0.03 −0.04 −0.03 −0.05 −0.03
0***
4***
2***
5***
9***
4***
0***
4***
(0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00
2)
1)
2)
1)
1)
1)
1)
1)
−0.00
−0.00
−0.00
−0.00
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
1
1
1
1
(0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00
2)
1)
2)
1)
2)
1)
2)
1)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Month-Year
Effects

Covers All Need Based Vulnerable

Payment
Plan

(1)

(7)

Yes

Region × Mont
h × Year
No
Effects

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(8)

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

N

2999 2999 2999 2999 2999 2999 2999 2999

R-Squared

0.977 0.988 0.977 0.988 0.977 0.988 0.977 0.988

The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural log of
monthly natural gas consumption (millions of cubic feet) per capita.
Covers All are NSO policies that cover the entire population in a state,
with no pre-qualified characteristics. Need Based indicates a date
based policy that is active for customers with demonstrated financial
hardship, unemployment, recipients of government welfare, etc.
Vulnerable indicates a date based policy that is active for customers
with illness, disability, and/or elderly or very young customers.
Payment Plan indicates a date based policy that is active for customers
who commit to a payment plan to pay their outstanding bill. NSO
Active represents the interaction between a state with an NSO policy
and a month when the policy is active for date-based NSO policies
only. Months that are partially covered by NSO policies are considered
fully covered in the data. The unit of observation is a state-month.
Standard errors clustered at State level are shown in parentheses.
***
p < 0.01.
**
p < 0.05.
Table 5. Natural gas consumption and NSO policy
heterogeneity: D-i-D estimates.
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Covers All
(1)
Policy
Type*N
SO
State

Need Based

(2)

(3)

Payment
Plan

Vulnerable

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

−0.15 −0.19 −0.24 −0.30 −0.124 −0.13 0.124* 0.132*
***
**
*
0***
2***
8***
6***
2***
(0.054 (0.054 (0.033 (0.033
(0.032 (0.042 (0.042
(0.032)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
0.433* 0.429* 0.382* 0.368* 0.419** 0.416* 0.428* 0.425*
**

**

**

**

*

**

**

**

Month
Covered (0.039 (0.039 (0.039 (0.038
(0.039 (0.038 (0.038
(0.038)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
0.249* 0.279* 0.186* 0.215* 0.218** 0.236*
Policy
0.047 0.045
*
*
**
**
*
**
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SO
(0.086 (0.085 (0.039 (0.039
(0.045 (0.058 (0.057
(0.046)
Active
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
Heating **
**
**
**
*
**
**
**
Degree
(0.000 (0.000 (0.000 (0.000
(0.000 (0.000 (0.000
Days
(0.000)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Retail
Price

−0.09 −0.10 −0.09 −0.10 −0.094 −0.10 −0.09 −0.10
5***
8***
5***
8***
7***
8***
6***
9***
(0.020 (0.022 (0.020 (0.024
(0.023 (0.020 (0.022
(0.021)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Median 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.006
Income
(0.008 (0.008 (0.008 (0.008
(0.007 (0.008 (0.008
(thousa
(0.007)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
nds)
Year
Dummie No
s

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

N

2999

2999

2999

2999

2999

2999

2999

2999

R0.648 0.662 0.653 0.670 0.649
Squared

0.663 0.649 0.663
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The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural log of
monthly natural gas consumption (millions of cubic feet) per capita.
Covers All are NSO policies that cover the entire population in a state,
with no pre-qualified characteristics. Need Based indicates a date
based policy that is active for customers with demonstrated financial
hardship, unemployment, recipients of government welfare, etc.
Vulnerable indicates a date based policy that is active for customers
with illness, disability, and/or elderly or very young customers.
Payment Plan indicates a date based policy that is active for customers
who commit to a payment plan to pay their outstanding bill. NSO State
represents a dummy variable indicating a state that has a date-based
NSO policy. Month covered represents a dummy variable for months
when NSO policies are active. NSO Active represents the interaction
between a state with an NSO policy and a month when the policy is
active for date-based NSO policies only. Months that are partially
covered by NSO policies are considered fully covered in the data. The
unit of observation is a state-month. Standard errors clustered at
State level are shown in parentheses.
**
p < 0.05.
Table 4 lends some support to the idea that the heterogeneous
NSO policies have differential effects on natural gas consumption.
Columns (1) and (2) show estimates of the impacts of NSO polices
that cover all customers, regardless of circumstance, on natural gas
consumption. The magnitude of these results suggests that NSO
policies covering all customers increase natural gas usage between 4.1
and 7%, statistically significant at conventional levels. This
specification uses all other NSO policies as the comparison group,
indicating state policies that cover all customers induce more natural
gas usage than other types of NSO policies. Columns (3) and (4) of
Table 4 show results for date-based NSO policies that also require the
customer to demonstrate some type of financial need. These results
show that NSO policies that are need-based (in addition to datebased) increase natural gas consumption by between 5.7 and 9.2%,
statistically significant in both specifications.
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Columns (5)–(8) of Table 4 show results for date based NSO
policies that only cover the vulnerable populations or those that agree
to a payment plan, respectively. The results for NSO policies that only
cover vulnerable populations are essentially zero in magnitude, and
not statistically significant. The results for NSO policies that only cover
those that agree to a payment plan are large but negative –
suggesting that this dimension of the policy could actually work to
reduce consumption among covered populations relative to other types
of NSO policies.
The difference-in-difference results for heterogeneous NSO
policies are shown in Table 5. The results for policies that cover all
customers and that are need based remain consistent with the twoway fixed effects specifications. The effect of a covers all policy is
larger in the difference-in-difference specification, showing that NSO
policies that cover all residents increase natural gas consumption
between 24.9 and 27.9%.

4.4. Alternative estimation: propensity score matching
The primary assumption driving both the two-way fixed effects
and difference-in-difference models is that there are no simultaneous
changes in areas where NSO policies are active at the time they are
active. Ultimately, this assumption is not testable as it is always
possible that unobservable changes are happening. However, if
unobservables are correlated with observable differences between
control and treated areas, we can limit the influence of unobservable
factors by conditioning the sample on observable characteristics. To
that end we use a variant of the propensity-score model demonstrated
in Crump et al. (2009), that suggests trimming the estimation sample
by some value of a propensity score. This procedure first requires
estimation of the likelihood that a state adopts a date-based NSO
policy:
(5)
Where NSO is a (0,1) indicator at the state level for places that have a
date based NSO policy. X represents the same control variables used
in our primary estimation, but averaged to the state level for all
months of our data. We also include regional dummy variables, σt. We
use the estimated coefficients from (5) to generate a prediction that
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each state implements an NSO policy and use this variable to create a
sub-sample for estimation. Our sub-sample includes all states in the
top half of the predicted NSO policy distribution, and we use that
group to re-estimate our primary models.
Table 6 shows the results for both the two-way fixed effect and
difference-in-difference models using the propensity score trimmed
sample. The difference-in-difference estimation produces much larger
magnitude results, on the order of 30–38% increase in natural gas
consumption. The two-way fixed effects models produce diverging
results. The standard two-way fixed effects model produces results
that are roughly double the magnitude of our primary results,
statistically significant at the one-percent level (suggesting in increase
in natural gas consumption between 8.7 and 9.8%). The model that
uses region specific month-year effects produces a null result that is
small in magnitude and actually has a negative sign.
Table 6. Natural gas consumption and NSO policies: matching
sample estimates.
Two Way FE Model
(1)

NSO Active

(2)

(3)

(4)

D-i-D Model
(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.087 0.098 −0.0 −0.0 0.308 0.355 0.310 0.382
***
***
***
***
***
***
12
02
(0.01 (0.01 (0.01 (0.01 (0.06 (0.05 (0.06 (0.05
6)
5)
3)
2)
2)
6)
2)
5)

Year Dummies

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

State Fixed
Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Month-Year
Effects

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Region × Month
× Year Effects

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

N

2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064

R-Squared

0.979 0.983

0.99 0.99
0.507 0.593 0.508 0.611
0
2
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Dependent variable is natural log of monthly natural gas
consumption (millions of cubic feet) per capita. Sample includes all
states with a propensity score above the median value (0.7176) as
generated from estimates in Eq. (5). Estimates in odd numbered
columns include controls for Heating Degree Days. Estimates in even
numbered columns include Heating Degree Days, Retail Price, and
Median Income. Standard errors clustered at State level in
parentheses.
***
p < 0.01.

5. Conclusion
This paper offers the first examination of the effect of NSO
policies on natural gas markets and finds that they lead to significantly
higher consumption levels. Our preferred specifications suggest that
activation of a NSO policy increases natural gas consumption by
between 4.7 and 4.8%, resulting in a total increase of between 66 and
67 billion cubic feet of natural gas consumed per winter season in
covered states, at a value of as much as $950–970 million annually.
The magnitude of the results we find suggests consumption increases
as high as 24.6% among households that are likely to be covered by
NSO policies.
Two explanations seem appropriate for our findings. The first,
and most basic, is that NSO policies work to provide a service to the
less fortunate that they would otherwise not be able to afford- home
heating during the winter months. This view would associate the
consumption increase we find with a transfer of resources, and could
easily be justified on equity grounds, or on efficiency grounds if there
is a negative externality caused by poor health outcomes. An
additional, and possibly alternative explanation, is that NSO policies
induce moral hazard because they do not require payment for services
used– effectively making the price zero for a time.12 In this way, NSO
policies may be leading some customers to consume more gas than is
necessary for basic comfort.13 In this view, the increase in
consumption resulting from NSO policies would be inefficient.
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As our empirical work features only date-based policies as the
treatment, and control states have temperature or other need-based
NSO policies, we may be picking up more of the moral hazard induced
consumption than equity associated consumption. Also, the
heterogeneous policy effects we find are strongest for policies that
cover all residents, further supporting the moral hazard explanation,
although ultimately we cannot definitively distinguish between the two
in our empirical work. Our work highlights a classic trade-off between
efficiency and equity in policy design. On the one hand, if the goal of
the policy is to alleviate human suffering, some NSO policy that
increases consumption may be justified; however, to the extent that
these policies lead to moral hazard, it may be worthwhile to reexamine the details of NSO policies.
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